Tehran has succeeded in maintaining the fundamental frameworks of its political system.
Earlier this week, U.S. President Donald Trump delivered an unusually strong public rebuke of Israel, marking one of the rare occasions in which he openly criticized America’s closest ally in the Middle East and tweeting that Israel should stop dropping bombs and return the aircrafts that are violating the ceasefire. This occurred during a time of significant tension, as Iran revealed its commitment to a tenuous ceasefire pact after a surge of regional conflict. The timing was significant, just when Trump aimed to declare another diplomatic triumph with a de-escalation agreement, Israel seemed intent on striking decisive blows to Iran’s military capabilities. Despite the tactical setbacks, Tehran has succeeded in maintaining the fundamental frameworks of its political system, deeply anchored in 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Qatar hosts the Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military facility in the region, which has served as a key logistical and operational hub for U.S. Central Command. Iran’s choice to target Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar rather than other U.S. facilities in the Gulf was a tactically deliberate action grounded in strategic communication. In contrast to Saudi Arabia or the UAE, where strikes might have endangered delicate diplomatic advancements or posed risks to Iran's economic relationships, Qatar provided a representative conscious selection. Al-Udeid, said to have been pre-evacuated, permitted Tehran to show defiance without inciting a full-scale U.S. response. But there were risks associated with this choice. Qatar has stronger diplomatic links with Iran than other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and it has historically acted as a backchannel mediator in conflicts between other conflicting states. Therefore, the choice to launch offensive operations on Qatari land was both strategic and sensitive; it sent a message to Tehran that American influence is still there, even among the more diplomatically balanced Gulf governments, and it also demonstrated a measured U.S. response.
Israel perceived the U.S. military engagement with Iran, even if it was limited, as a strategic victory. Tel Aviv has long maintained that Iran has been able to get closer to having a nuclear weapon because of Washington's hesitation. Iran will continue to enrich uranium under the cover of its revolutionary ideology and strategic ambiguity, according to the Israeli establishment, especially its security elite, unless active deterrence is implemented.
Trump, nonetheless, seemed resolute in establishing distinct limits. Although he consented to authorize precise attacks on Iran’s nuclear, his decisions aligned with the tenets of his “America First” policy: display power, steer clear of involvement. His red lines were not theoretical ideas but based on political strategy, hamper Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapon, yet avoid dragging the U.S. into another lengthy war in the Middle East. This stance embodies Trump’s enduring doubt regarding extensive military interventions. By doing this, Trump aimed to convey a message of deterrence while avoiding escalation, guaranteeing that the U.S. maintained strategic advantage without getting involved in a prolonged conflict. For Trump, power resided in unpredictability.
The stakes for Iran's future are at an all-time high as it grapples with the consequences of a military conflict, internal security issues, and an impending leadership transition. The combined factors of Ebrahim Raisi's departure, Supreme Leader Khamenei's age, and the IRGC's firm position have ignited a chaotic phase of political turmoil. The broader question persists: will Iran's entrenched leadership recommit to the past, or will this precarious moment create an opportunity for a reassessment of its ideological, political, and institutional bases? The government is expected to strengthen its grip on authority by means of nationalism, intensified security measures, and adjustments in military strategy. Iran's choices in the coming months could alter not just its internal structure but also its position in a rapidly evolving regional and international landscape. Iran emerged bruised but not broken. Iran came out hurt but unharmed. For the time being, the truce offers a reprieve, but the larger conflict which is based on distrust, regional rivalries, and nuclear brinkmanship is still ongoing.
(Dr Sreshtha Chakraborty is Assistant Professor, Bennett University)
