Pakistan's security forces have faced a surge in militant attacks with no signs of abatement.
Lately, Pakistan's security forces have faced a surge in militant attacks with no signs of abatement. The most brazen incident, a train hijacking by Baloch separatists, left dozens dead, including both militants and passengers.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan's Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) met with Army Chief Gen Asim Munir, emphasising stricter implementation of counterterrorism frameworks — the National Action Plan (NAP) and 'Vision Azm-e-Istehkam' — to curb escalating violence in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the military has suffered significant casualties.
Gen. Munir blamed governance failures and legal shortcomings while advocating for Pakistan's transformation into a "hard state" to combat terrorism effectively. But how much "harder" can Pakistan become? Essentially, Gen. Munir proposes prioritising strict security over the current constitutional 'hybrid' democracy.
During the in-camera discussions, political leaders reportedly questioned what additional measures the military-backed hybrid regime could implement, though they stopped short of openly declaring the military's counterterrorism strategy a complete failure.
The alarming toll from Pakistan's security crisis becomes starkly clear in the latest data. The South Asia Terrorism Portal reveals that in 2025 so far, militant attacks have claimed the lives of over 300 military personnel.
A self-inflicted crisis
Pakistan's security establishment has systematically neutered key institutions —parliament, judiciary, and media — particularly regarding security, foreign affairs, and human rights matters. The nation's worst conflicts — with India in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999 to the endless "war on terror" — were all either initiated or exacerbated by military rulers. Decades of heavy-handed policies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Formerly North West Frontier Province) and Balochistan have only deepened wounds, yet the military demands even greater authoritarian measures rather than introspection.
Before pursuing further martial law-like solutions, Pakistan's security establishment must confront an uncomfortable question: Why have three decades of "kinetic operations" failed to eliminate terrorism? The answer lies in the military's persistent obstruction of genuine democracy — a system capable of resolving conflicts through political dialogue, equitable governance, and rule of law.
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the operations are against Islamist militants who were once nurtured by the Pakistan military as opposed to Balochistan where it is a separatist movement. Pakistan has often accused India of backing the insurgency in Balochistan.
The ‘Soft State’ paradox
The concept of Pakistan as a "hard state" collapses under scrutiny when examined through Gunnar Myrdal's framework. In his 1968 work Asian Drama, the Swedish economist characterised "soft states" as suffering weak governance, ineffective law enforcement, and an inability to maintain discipline without brute force — an exact description of modern Pakistan.
Myrdal observed that reliance on force to suppress dissent signals institutional failure, not strength. A truly "hard" state would enforce rule of law, deliver justice, and govern effectively — precisely where Pakistan fails. Instead, it vacillates between military rule and dysfunctional democracy, unable to resolve Balochistan's insurgency or systemic corruption.
Anatol Lieven's assessment in Pakistan: A Hard Country (2011) remains painfully relevant: Pakistan remains "divided, disorganised, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, and oppressive." The military's security-first approach has not eliminated extremism — it has merely displaced it.
The Balochistan test case
The military's recent crackdown in Balochistan — under the guise of "national security" — has targeted human rights activists, peaceful protesters, and even medical professionals like Dr. Mahrang Baloch. The Nobel Peace Prize nominee now faces dubious terrorism charges for leading a movement against enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.
Far from quelling dissent, her detention has galvanised mass resistance. Thousands have joined strikes and the Balochistan National Party's "long march," while Eid celebrations transformed into protest rallies — clear evidence that military repression cannot break Baloch resolve.
The "hard state" was never Pakistan's founding vision — it was imposed by generals and has yielded only violence, distrust, and fragmentation. Continued repression will not bring stability. The only viable solution lies in democracy — real, substantive democracy. The critical question remains: Will Pakistan's military establishment permit it?
